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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the logic behind the secondary buyouts in Finland 
between 2002 and 2014 using the hand-collected sample of buyouts. The thesis investigates 
whether the secondary buyouts are motivated by efficiency gains or driven by market 
conditions or liquidity demand. In addition, the role of collusion in secondary buyouts is 
examined. Finally, this thesis studies how secondary buyout are priced. 
  
Value creation is the basis of private equity industry. Previous academic literature shows 
private equity buyouts has positive impact on target companies’ operating performance. In 
the context of value creation the logic of secondary buyout is still a puzzle. This thesis 
investigates with year-by-year examination the development of the operating performance 
after secondary buyouts. In order to find out the alternative motives for secondary buyouts, 
probit model is used to find out how equity and debt market condition and liquidity demand 
effect on the exit route. To examine the role of collusion in secondary buyouts cross-
participation matrix is built to identify possible trade patterns. The pricing of secondary 
buyouts is studied with comparable industry transaction method against first-time buyouts 
using the Ordinary Least Squares regression. 
 
Evidence of the study do not show efficiency gains for target companies in secondary 
buyouts. Results suggests that market condition is the main driver of secondary buyouts. 
When debt market is favorable, the probability of exiting through secondary buyout increases 
significantly. On the other hand, favorable equity market is found to increase the probability 
of other exit routes, IPO and the selling strategic buyer, although with less significant results. 
In addition, results also shows that secondary buyouts are associated with higher value 
compared to first-time buyouts. The higher value is significantly driven by favorable debt 
market condition and the size of the target company.      
_________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Secondary buyout, Private equity, SBO,   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1.  Background 
 
Secondary buyout is a private equity buyout where the seller and the buyer are both private 
equity funds. Secondary buyouts rapidly growing and controversial field in private equity 
industry. Wang (2012) illustrates the pace of the growth of secondary buyouts in recent years 
by arguing the percentage of secondary buyouts of all the buyouts has grown from 1980s 
leveraged buyout boom’s 13 % to 2012 approximately 35 % only in five years. Also, the 
economic significance of secondary buyouts can be noticed on Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
study of the evolution of private equity markets, where they present that total enterprise value 
of the target companies in secondary buyouts has grown from the 1980s 2 % to 25 % in the 
second buyout boom in mid 2010s. In Europe, the secondary buyouts are more popular than 
ever at the end of the year 2015. (Bain & Company 2016) Also in Finland, the exits through 
secondary buyout of Finnish target companies is settled around 20 % in 21st century. (FVCA 
2016) 
 
The ultimate driver of the secondary buyouts has been a puzzle among the academic world. 
Since the 1980s leveraged buyout boom private equity buyouts are held effective for both 
investors’ returns and the target company’s operating performance through the value 
creation. However, the value creation in secondary buyouts has been challenging if not 
impossible in a profitable way because of all the actions made in the first-time buyout. 
Additionally, secondary buyouts are held very high-priced and therefore unprofitable to go 
through. Still, the secondary buyouts tend have stable part in private equity sector. 
 
This thesis is attempting to provide an explanation of the logic behind the secondary buyouts. 
This is studied by investigating the potential motives for secondary buyouts of Finnish target 
companies. With unique hand-collected sample of the financial statements of the target 
companies of secondary buyouts this thesis is investigating whether the value creation 
measured from operating performance is the main driver of the secondary buyouts or is there 
other possible explanations. 
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The motives for secondary buyouts are not necessarily derived on the value creation potential 
of the target company. The circumstances of the private equity companies on the sell-side or 
buy-side might effect on the decisions of exits or investments. In addition, financial 
environment and economic situation are meaningful when considering the possible drivers 
of these decisions. Also, the growth of secondary buyout volume and the distinct illogic 
around the secondary buyouts has aroused suspicions that private equity companies are 
participating in these transactions for unethical reasons towards the investors and target 
companies by helping other private equity companies to exit.  These aforementioned possible 
motives for secondary buyouts are discussed and later examined in this thesis to understand 
the logic behind the secondary buyouts. Also, this thesis investigates how the secondary 
buyouts are priced, because the possible drivers of the secondary buyouts might impact on 
the value of the buyout compared the traditional buyout. 
 
Most of the literature considering the private equity sector is considering the leveraged 
buyouts and their influence on target companies’ operating performance and returns on 
investors. Only recently there have been released papers regarding the secondary buyouts. 
Achleitner and Figge (2012), Wang (2012), Bonini (2012) and Jenkinson and Sousa (2012) 
study the operating performance of target companies after the secondary buyout. They also 
presents the characteristics of the secondary buyout target companies and study possible 
other motives for secondary buyouts.  
 
This thesis contributes to these previous research of secondary buyouts by providing the 
Finnish sample of companies gone through secondary buyout. Previous studies focused on 
the large both large private equity markets and financial markets as a whole like U.S. and 
UK. This thesis attempts to provide a point of view in small market with active secondary 
buyouts sector, to unite the theories and empirical analysis within the law and order of private 
equity industries academic research. This thesis also contributes the buyout literature as a 
whole, since Finnish private equity markets are not studied. The unique hand-collected 
sample of buyout companies also provides the important evidence in the field of study where 
the information is in accordance with its name private. 
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1.2.Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of the study is thesis is to investigate logic behind the secondary buyouts. To be 
more precisely, thesis investigates whether the secondary buyouts are motivated by the value 
creation in buyouts which can be measured as increased operating performance of target 
company, or is there other explanation of the drivers of the secondary buyouts. Therefore, 
the thesis examines three possible motives for secondary buyouts and the role of these 
motives in the pricing of the transactions. 
 
The first motive for secondary buyout discussed in this thesis is the efficiency gains, which 
is led by increased operating performance of the target company of secondary buyout.  This 
motive is consistent with the motives for first-time buyouts. The first-time buyout targets 
have shown to increase their operating performance and efficiency after the buyout. 
 
The second possible motive for secondary buyouts in this thesis is the liquidity-based market 
timing, which suggests that market condition is the driver that conduct the exit choices of 
buyout investments. The exit through the IPO might be more attractive in times of favorable 
equity markets. On the contrary, the alternative exit route like secondary buyout could be the 
first priority in favorable debt market. Additionally, the times hot debt market can lead to 
over investing and therefore increase the secondary buyouts. Also, the target company’s 
seller’s demand of liquidity is a possible explanation why exit through secondary buyout is 
an attractive option. The demand of liquidity is assumed to have effect in way that the 
duration of the investment period in target company increases the probability of exiting 
through secondary buyout because the private equity fund feel the pressure to remove the 
company in its portfolio in the case it has been held for longer than expected. Other liquidity 
matter is the nearby fundraising of private equity fund, which can be a motive for remove the 
older target company in portfolio quickly, as a signal of success of the investments and exit 
routes of earlier fund. 
 
The third possible motive for secondary buyout this thesis consider is the collusion. The idea 
of this motive is that private equity companies help each other when in need of quick exiting 
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of the older portfolio companies. The light regulation in private equity industry and the 
limited amount of private equity companies operating around has aroused suspicions that 
secondary buyouts are private equity companies’ collusion to remove bad assets in portfolio 
and therefore boost the future fundraising. Also, it is assumed that due to a buyer’s motive 
only to help the seller in exit the prices of the secondary buyouts are artificially high. (Wang 
2012.) 
 
The last purpose of the study is to investigate how the secondary buyouts are priced.  If 
secondary buyouts are driven other motive than the value creation potential, presumable the 
pricing is also influenced by the drivers. Secondary buyouts are suggested to be priced with 
higher value in comparison with first-time buyouts. Therefore, the logic behind the secondary 
buyouts is tightly connected with the pricing of the secondary buyouts. 
 
1.3. Research hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses of this thesis focus on the drivers of secondary buyouts. The logic behind the 
first-time buyouts is clear, the value creation potential is the basis of the private equity buyout 
industry. Previous literature of leveraged buyouts has shown the effect on buyouts through 
value creation. The value creation potential of secondary buyouts is uncertain and without 
comprehensive empirical evidence. This thesis is investigating the value creation potential 
and alternative explanation of popularity of secondary buyouts. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis of the thesis can be expressed as follows:  
 
H0: The secondary buyouts are driven by efficiency gains 
 
       H1: The secondary buyouts are not driven by efficiency gains 
 
The efficiency gains is the outcome of the value creation and is shown as increased operating 
performance of the target company. In the case null hypothesis is rejected, for examine the 
other possible motive for secondary buyouts the second hypothesis goes as follows: 
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     H2: The market condition is the driver of secondary buyouts 
 
The second hypothesis is built around the equity market and debt market condition. These 
market condition are suggested to impact especially on the exit route of the first-time buyouts. 
To complete the investigation of the liquidity-based market timing theory, the third 
hypothesis is: 
 
           H3: The seller’s liquidity demand is motive for secondary buyout 
 
The third hypothesis suggests that the holding period of the buyout company effects on the 
choice of exit route. That is, the longer the holding period, the bigger probability to exit 
through secondary buyouts. 
 
Finally, the fourth hypothesis considering the possible motives for secondary buyouts is: 
 
    H4: The secondary buyout are private equity companies’ collusion 
 
The fourth hypothesis therefore asks if the secondary buyouts are driven by the assist on 
exiting with other private equity company. 
 
In the completing test of the thesis, the pricing of secondary buyouts is studied. Therefore, 
the final hypothesis goes as follows: 
 
    H5: Pricing of the secondary buyouts do not differ from first time buyouts 
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Actually, the hypotheses do not rule out one another. There might be several possible motives 
for secondary buyouts, although if the efficiency gains is the main driver of the secondary 
buyouts, the examination of the latter hypotheses may not be rational. 
 
1.4. Limitations of the study 
 
The previous studies of private equity buyouts have suffered from the lack of data 
considering the buyout deals and the target companies’ annual filings. This thesis provides 
hand-collected sample of consolidated financial statements of the companies prior and after 
the buyout to ensure the operating performance can be measured in reliable and the 
development is comparable. Due to that sorting the unconsolidated financial statements from 
the sample, the sample size is quite small. Also, the comprehensive buyout deal information 
is not announced for every deal, therefore the sample in the analysis of pricing the secondary 
buyouts the sample is even smaller. However, to ensure the sample to represent the whole 
market in chapter 4 the characteristics of final sample and the initial sample is compared. 
Also, in the chapter 5 the Heckman selection model is used to ensure there is no sample 
selection problem. However, the pricing of the secondary buyouts may suffer from the lack 
of announced deal information. 
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. In second chapter is reviewed the private equity 
industry and its characteristics. Second chapter also introduces the secondary buyouts and 
links the research problem with the following theories in chapter three. These theories are 
focusing the potential motives for secondary buyouts. In addition, the chapter three presents 
the previous literature of value creation of leveraged buyouts and also literature of 
explanations and impacts of secondary buyouts. Fourth chapter presents the data used in the 
thesis and methodologies in analysis. Fifth chapter shows the result of analysis and discusses 
the results in the context of hypotheses. Finally, sixth chapter summarizes the main results 
and provides conclusion.   
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1. Private Equity  
 
In private equity markets the private equity company provides capital to invest in private 
companies, or public companies which are consequently going private. Most of those capital 
provided to private companies is done by private equity fund. Private equity fund is a 
collective investment vehicle which raises fund mainly from large institutional investors for 
example banks, insurance companies or pension funds. This vehicle later makes investments 
to target companies.  
 
Private equity investments can be separated in two categories, buyout capital and 
development capital. In buyout capital the private equity fund buys shares from existing 
shareholder whereas in development capital new shares are issued to private equity company. 
Also, venture capital which makes investments to early stage companies can be seen as a part 
of the private equity markets. For those three form of private equity capital this thesis focus 
on the buyout capital, more precisely buyouts where majority of company’s shares is bought 
by private equity fund. In addition, private equity backed management buyout, where the 
management of the company acquires the company with finance from private equity can be 
seen very much alike than merely private equity company’s acquisition. In most of the 
management buyout the private equity fund acquires the majority stake of shares and 
management are the minority owner. (Gilligan et al. 2010.) 
 
It is essential to understand the nature of private equity fund. For investors of those funds the 
profit of the investment is made when exiting the target or portfolio company, not by 
dividends or interest payments. Private equity funds have usually agreed 10-year limited 
lifetime during that period private equity fund need to make profits by selling the 
investments. In this kind of investment the value creation and successful exit are the key 
factors. (Gilligan et al. 2010.) 
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In Finland, the private equity sector is relatively young. Like in the rest of the Europe the 
private equity industry growth strongly not until in the mid-1990s. Nowadays the private 
equity industry has established in Finland and the volume of the private equity investments 
has grown steadily excluding the financial crisis. Characteristic in Finnish private equity 
sector is its strong impact on early-stage target companies. However, also the buyout 
investments measured by both transactions number and value has grown significantly from 
mid-1990s. (FVCA). 
 
2.2 Value Creation 
 
The value creation and effects on target company’s performance in leveraged buyouts have 
been studied quite comprehensively. In academic literature the leveraged buyout is 
considered to be a private equity buyout financed with high leverage. Behind most of the 
private equity buyouts is significant leverage, which the private equity fund must meet at the 
end of its life. This thesis does not separate the buyouts with higher or lower leverage, the 
basic nature and characteristics are the same. 
 
The target companies are not alike and neither are the private equity companies. Therefore 
the investment strategies varies a lot and there is not one certain value creation solution for 
every investment. However, private equity companies tend to be aware of that and therefore 
the target companies’ characteristics are many times alike. Private equity buyout funds favor 
mature and strong companies with stable cash flow and non-cyclical business. (Loos 2007.) 
 
There are several sources in value creation in private equity buyouts. Academic researcher 
analyze these sources as in many layers. First layer is the drivers that effect directly on the 
operating efficiency or are connected with the optimal use of resources. These drivers are 
described as direct, intrinsic, and operational drivers. These drivers tend to increase the target 
company’s free cash flow. The second layer are non-operational drivers which can be 
described as indirect, extrinsic, and value capturing drivers. These second layer drivers are 
usually not quantifiable, but these drivers lead to distension of the created value between the 
buyout and the exit. The academic studies have shown that approximately two third of the 
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value is created through the direct value drivers within the holding period. The rest one third 
of the value is created through the indirect drivers in the transaction of the buyout. (Loos 
2007.) 
 
As previously mentioned, direct value drivers has direct impact on the target company’s free 
cash flow. The increment of free cash flow can be achieved by increased revenues, reduction 
of costs or more efficiency or with the financial engineering. (Loos 2007.) 
 
2.3. Exit 
 
As mentioned earlier, private equity fund’s profit is made by selling the investment asset. 
Therefore, perhaps the most significant phase of the private equity investment is the exiting. 
Based on the exit the succeeding of the investment can be evaluated. In addition, the non-
existence of exit is a strong judgment itself. Therefore the private equity buyouts are said to 
be structured with an exit in mind. Another key point about the importance of exit is the 
nature of private equity fund. If investors make profit mostly on exits, for private equity 
company remarkable profit channel is fundraising. The successful lifecycle and exit of 
portfolio companies of private equity fund is essential for succeeding the future fundraisings. 
The most important investors of private equity funds are the institutional investors who 
consider their future investments by the profits of the previous participation of private equity 
fund. In addition, if the exit non-existence, ergo the private equity fund has failed to find an 
exit route, the future fundraising is even more challenging. (Gilligan et al. 2010.) 
 
Traditionally the exit choices of private equity investments have been trade sale to a strategic 
buyer and initial public offering (IPO). In early days of private equity sector the secondary 
buyout, the sale to another private equity fund was rare. In the 21st century has generalized 
and emerged another exit routes. In addition of secondary buyouts of portfolio companies the 
secondary buyout of the whole portfolio is common more often. A leveraged recapitalization 
and exit through bankruptcy or receiverships can be seen as other exit routes. Economically 
the most significant of these new wave exit routes is secondary buyout. (Gilligan et al. 2010.) 
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2.4 Secondary buyout 
 
In early days of private equity sector the exit through secondary buyouts were rare. On the 
other hand the buy-side’s willingness to make deals with another private equity company 
was low. During the development of the private equity sector and in a turbulence of the whole 
financial sector the volume of secondary buyouts have increase significantly. From 2001-
2007 approximately third of the larger buyouts were secondary buyouts. The financial crisis 
at the end of that particular period shook the whole private equity sector strongly, and 
secondary buyout volume dropped. But that downturn was temporary and from 2014-2015 
the secondary buyout volume has recovered almost fully and especially in Europe has grown 
significantly. (Bain & Company 2016; Gilligan et al 2010.) 
 
The big proportion of private equity exits has inspire the academic world to investigate if 
there is hiding something other than traditional characteristics of leveraged buyouts. In other 
words, the interesting question is that if the leveraged buyout is effective way of value 
creation by itself, can another round add another layer of value? Thus, can operating 
performance be enhanced further by secondary buyout?  
 
In Finland, the trend in secondary buyouts follows the European private equity markets. 
Hence, the secondary buyouts volume have grown remarkably and nowadays in Europe the 
secondary buyouts are relatively more common compared with US private equity markets. 
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Figure 1 shows how secondary buyout percentage of all the private has developed since the 
financial crisis. Noticeable is the percentage in 2011 when Finnish private equity funds exit 
through secondary buyouts nearly 70 % of times. After 2011, the trend seems to be that 
significant proportion of Finnish target companies’ exits happens through secondary buyouts. 
On the contrary, Finnish private equity funds tend to find other route of exits more often. 
According the statistics from Figure 1, investigation of specifically Finnish target companies 
is justifiable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Secondary buyouts as percentage of all the exits in Finnish private equity markets. Figure shows 
both Finnish private equity funds’ exits and exits of Finnish target companies owned by foreign private 
equity fund. (FVCA 2016) 
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3. THEORIES OF MOTIVATIONS FOR SEDONDARY BUYOUTS 
 
 
Basically secondary buyouts are alike first-time buyouts, and therefore the motivation behind 
the transaction is clear, ergo value creation and profit making. However, if the private equity 
sector creates value with leverage, better corporate governance, and cost reducing, what is 
left for a second round? There are of course footing for a strategic management and specified 
competence in private equity managers who could add another layer of value in company 
value. Nevertheless, the strong growth of secondary buyout volumes causes questions if there 
is something else. According to Wang (2012) possible reasons for secondary buyout are 
efficiency gains, liquidity-based market timing and collusion. This thesis is also built around 
those potential motivation for secondary buyouts. These motivations take account a point of 
view of both the bidder and the seller. 
 
3.1. Efficiency gains 
 
The value creation was covered in previous chapter. As a motivation for secondary buyout 
efficiency gains is quite explicit. Value creation in buyouts leads in profit when realizing the 
investment. The value created should therefore be seen on operating performance.  
 
There are quite comprehensive literature considering the operating performance in leveraged 
buyouts. The direct value drivers is considered throughout in previous literature. Kaplan 
(1989) and Jensen (1989) states that target company’s operating earnings increase 
significantly from the year prior the buyout to the third year after the buyout. They find that 
cash flow grows even more, and operating performance improves almost in every indicator. 
(Jensen 1989: Smith 1990).  These improvement on operating performance are driven by 
high leverage, mitigation of agency problems and improved corporate governance, and 
operational engineering  
 
According to Jensen (1989a) the main source of value creation in buyouts comes from the 
organizational changes. These changes lead to enhancement of the company’s operating and 
the investment decisions. Baker and Wruck (1989), Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990) also 
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show, that target companies with potential of high cash flows are more likely to go through 
buyout. Wide range of previous literature presents the results of positive influence of buyout 
to the target company’s operating performance. Kaplan (1989) shows that management’s 
buyouts are associated with the improvements of the target company operating performance. 
Smith (1990b) states that increased cash flow is correlated with the ownership structure and 
amount of debt originated from buyout. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that factors which 
have gone through the buyouts are more productive than factors which have not gone through 
buyout.  
 
Other way value creation of buyouts can increase the cash flow is the more efficient use of 
the company’s assets. Baker and Wruck (1989), Smith (1990) show that more efficient 
management of working capital after buyouts lead to significant increases of operating cash 
flow. In addition, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) presents that buyout companies also have 
remarkably lower working capital in comparison to non-buyout companies. 
 
Target companies also are boosting their sales after the buyouts. Singh (1990) shows how 
the companies exited through IPO have significantly higher revenues in comparison with the 
peer group companies.  
 
The one significant way of creating value is the financial engineering. By the financial 
engineering is meant that after the buyout, the private equity company guide the company in 
bank lending, IPOs, bond underwriting and subsequent stock sales. (Loos 2007) The target 
companies tend to have lower agency costs of debt and cost of financial distress. (Jensen 
1989)  
 
The indirect drivers of value creating also effect on the operating performance. Jensen 
(1989a) shows that buyouts create value by reducing the agency costs. Smith (1990) presents 
that the change of organizational structure allows the organization to take advantage of those 
reduction of agency costs and therefore increase the operating performance. 
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The use of debt also can be seen as value creation mechanism. Following agency cost theory 
of Jensen (1986;1989a;1989b) that large amount of debt decreases the free cash flow and 
therefore the management use the money wisely rather than use it inefficiently. 
 
The value creation in buyouts can be seen on the better operating performance. Achrarya et 
al. (2012) shows that after buyout the target companies shows significant increase in earnings 
before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations (EBITDA). However, Guo et al. 
presents in a recent study that U.S. target companies of buyouts do not show significantly 
different operating performance in comparison with non-buyout companies. 
 
Value creation in secondary buyouts has been studied narrowly. Jensen et al. (1989b) states 
that value created in secondary buyouts can only be achieved with new strategies or 
investments. Bonini (2012) study that secondary buyouts do not influence enhancements of 
target companies’ operating performance after buyout. Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) study the 
difference in performance between companies exiting thorough IPO and secondary buyouts. 
The companies exiting through IPO were superior in their performance in comparison to 
secondary buyout targets. Wang (2012) find no evidence of efficiency gains in companies 
after secondary buyouts, although improvements in EBITDA, the profitability dropped and 
was weaker than companies after first-time buyouts. However, Achleitner and Figge (2014) 
find that the value creation potential in secondary buyout targets equals the first-time buyout 
targets, only the leverage were significantly higher with secondary buyout targets. 
 
3.2. Liquidity-based market timing 
 
Wang (2012) states that potential motivation for secondary buyout might not be entirely 
about value creation in target company. According the liquidity-based market timing the 
secondary buyout can be seen as a consequent of capital market conditions or the sell-side 
private equity company’s incentives to realize the investment as quick as possible. (Wang 
2012). Private equity companies make profit by creating value and realizing the value in exit. 
Traditionally these exit choices have been IPO and selling to strategic buyer. However, in 
reality the attractiveness of exit choices depends on capital market conditions. Hot public 
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equity markets tend to steer the financing choices and behavior. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
investigates that even low-leverage companies prefer on issue equity rather than debt when 
their market value is high. Pagano et al. (1998) states study that companies willingness to 
IPOs is greater when the market-to-book values in same industry are high. In addition, Lerner 
(1994) find that privately-held venture-backed companies go public when equity market is 
peaking and rely on private equity when equity markets are in their lowest. Rhodes-Kropf et 
al. (2005) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) find that market-to-book values and their 
misvaluation effect on merger activity. Lucas and McDonald (1990) strengthen the market 
timing theory by stating that company’s equity issue is followed the downturn of equity 
markets.  
 
These findings in public markets receive support also from private markets. Cao (2011) finds 
that duration of the leveraged buyout investment is significantly shorter when IPO conditions 
and high industry valuations are favorable, meaning that exit through IPO or selling to 
strategic buyer are more tempting. Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) study that stock market 
performance affect the possibility of venture backed companies’ IPO exit; the longer the 
investment duration and lower the equity market performance, the weaker the IPO exit 
possibilities.  
 
Liquidity-based market timing states that if the equity market is cold, the attractiveness to go 
public is low. The previous literature also highlights that the option to exit through selling to 
strategic buyer is unattractive when the equity market is cold. In these kind of market 
conditions the secondary buyout might be the most attractive exit route. In addition, when 
Axelson et al. (2009) notify that when the debt market is hot, ergo when companies prefer 
debt over equity issue, private equity companies tend to over-invest, thus increasing the 
secondary buyouts as well. 
 
For private equity company the optimal investment strategy would be to hold the buyout 
target until the profit from the selling it is highest possible. But because of the nature of 
private equity fund, the investment period is limited and exit is inevitable, therefore the exit 
strategy sometimes is not optimal. Also, private equity company makes significant 
proportion of its profit from fundraisings, thus the attractiveness to exit quickly grows. 
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Private equity raises funds recurring from the same large institutional investors, therefore the 
new fundraising cannot be arrange until the old investments are realized. Or at least the 
fundraising would not be as successful. (Chung et al. 2009). According to Wang (2012), the 
private equity company’s exit choices are also dependent on the liquidity need of the private 
equity company. This liquidity need can be result from the need of new fundraising or 
because portfolio company has been held very long.  These scenarios add attractiveness of 
exit through non-optimal route. Wang (2012) find supporting evidence of liquidity-based 
market timing, secondary buyout is more likely to happen when equity market is cold or the 
debt market is hot. Also, they find that fundraising need and long holding period effect on 
probability to exit through secondary buyout. Bonini (2012) find that secondary buyout 
activity is influenced on the debt market condition and the reputation of the private equity 
companies.  
 
3.3. Collusion 
 
The third and final potential motivation for secondary buyout following Wang (2012) is the 
collusion. Because of the industry’s characteristics, only a “few” player and almost 
nonexistent regulation, the collusion motive has lift its head concurrently with increasing 
secondary buyout volume. Existing collusion would be alarming to the markets and both 
investors and the target companies; to increase liquidity private equity companies trade their 
weak assets among each other and in addition do it with overprices to raise the profits 
excessively. Shortly, in collusion private equity companies help each other detriment to other 
market participants. The above-market price in buyout motivated from collusion decreases 
the profit of the private equity investors, and the increasing leverage due to high deal value 
eventually hurt the target company as well. (Wang 2012.) 
 
The academic research of collusion motive is very narrow. That could be derived from the 
challenge to build a credible methodology not to mention significant results. Wang (2012) 
study the collusion and find no clear pattern that could prove the collusion. However, they 
emphasize that the finding certainly do not rule out the possible collusion, because the big 
private equity companies operate all over the world. On the contrary, Bonini (2010) finds 
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supporting evidence of collusion motive. According to their study the highly ranked private 
equity players deal more with each other and with higher deal values and multiples. 
 
3.4. Deal prices of secondary buyouts 
 
The pricing of secondary buyouts is also studied quite narrowly. Wang (2012) find that deals 
in secondary buyouts have higher deal value in comparison to first-time buyouts. They find 
that the main explanation of the higher value is the debt market condition. Also Achleitner 
and Figge (2014) find evidence that secondary buyouts are more expensive than first-time 
buyouts. They assume the market timing and private equity companies’ negotiation skills are 
the explanations of the higher value.      
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the drivers for secondary buyouts in Finland. To be 
more specific, the potential motives for secondary buyouts of Finnish target companies are 
investigated. These potential motives to be tested are efficiency gains, liquidity-based market 
timing, and collusion. In addition, the pricing of secondary buyouts in comparison to the first-
time buyouts is tested. To execute these analyses, wide range of data is needed to gather in 
several sources. Description of the data and the methodology is provided in the following 
subchapters. 
 
4.1. Data and sample statistics 
 
The primary data used in this thesis is the deal information of secondary buyouts of Finnish 
target companies in 2002-2014. The data of deal information is from Mergermarket which 
provides quite comprehensive information of European mergers and acquisitions, and private 
equity deals. According to Mergermarket Deal Criteria the database includes information of 
deal value up from $ 5 million, which naturally excludes all the smallest deal from 
examination. However, the ideal target company for buyout is mature and strong, therefore 
the buyout deals usually are not among the smallest. Therefore, Mergermarket has a good 
coverage of deal information. 
 
To construct the sample all the buyouts where the target company is Finnish are identified. 
Buyout is a deal where the buyer of the company is private equity fund. Later, the sample is 
restricted to completed deals where majority of the shares were acquired. The sample of 
Finnish target companies’ buyout consist of 219 deals. Further, this sample is separated into 
firs-time buyouts and secondary buyouts. As defined earlier, secondary buyout is a deal 
where the buyer and the seller are both private equity funds. From the buyout sample 62 
secondary buyout were identified. 
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The accounting data of the target companies to test the potential motives for secondary 
buyout and the pricing of secondary buyouts is hand-collected from Orbis. Because Orbis 
shows the accounting data only from last ten years, some of the prior buyout accounting data 
of the oldest deals is collected from Kauppalehti Tietopalvelut and Suomen Asiakastieto. 
Also, from these previous databases the possible parent companies of target companies is 
identified. Usually in private equity buyouts the shell company is created as parent of target 
company. In secondary buyouts there are obviously shell company both prior and after the 
buyout.  Essential for the reliable evidence of the tested hypotheses is to find consolidated 
financial statements of target companies both prior and after buyout. All the target companies 
where the consolidated financial statements could not be identified were dropped out of the 
sample. In some cases, the target company is a business unit of larger company and the 
separate financial statements is being unable to identify. On the contrary, some off the 
buyouts are so called add-on buyout, where the target company is merged immediately to 
another target company. In those add-on cases also the separate financial statements non-
exist. Thus, those business units and add-ons are dropped out of the sample. Altogether, out 
of 219 buyout 140 buyout with consolidated financial statements were identified. This final 
sample consists of 100 first-time buyout and 40 secondary buyout.  
 
Table 1 shows the identified buyouts and the percentage of secondary buyouts per the year 
from Mergermarket. Notable is, that besides the years 2002, 2009, and 2010 the percentage 
of secondary buyouts stays quite high. That arouse a question that if the secondary buyouts 
follow some kind of cycle, ergo have relationship with macroeconomic variables, as 
liquidity-based market timing theory suggests. 
 
Table 1 also illustrates the industry distribution of the target companies which are acquired 
through secondary buyout. In industry categorization is used the Fama-French 48 industry 
classification. The industry SIC codes are collected from Orbis cross checked with industry 
codes from Kauppalehti Tietopalvelu so that target company is in right category. The 
percentage of secondary buyouts in the initial sample compared to the final sample, as well 
as industry distribution compared between the samples show that the final sample should be 
representative to the secondary buyout market.  
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Table 1. Secondary buyout activities in Finland. Panel A shows sample of buyouts in Finland and 
percentage of secondary buyouts. Panel B illustrates the industry distribution of all the buyouts, secondary 
buyouts and the final sample of secondary buyouts categorized according to Fama-French 48 industry. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Buyout activities during 2002-2014
Year Number of transactions Percentage
All buyouts Secondary buyouts
2002 10 0 0 %
2003 15 3 20 %
2004 14 2 14 %
2005 14 5 36 %
2006 17 4 24 %
2007 30 16 53 %
2008 23 7 30 %
2009 8 0 0 %
2010 15 1 7 %
2011 25 8 32 %
2012 11 4 36 %
2013 10 6 60 %
2014 27 6 22 %
Total 219 62 28 %
Panel B: Industry distribution
Fama-French 48 industry classification All buyouts All SBOs Final Sample SBOs
N Percentage N Percentage N Percentage
Business Services 38 17,4 % 9 14,5 % 4 10,0 %
Construction materials 20 9,1 % 9 14,5 % 7 17,5 %
Wholesale 18 8,2 % 6 9,7 % 5 12,5 %
Machinery 15 6,8 % 4 6,5 % 3 7,5 %
Trasportation 15 6,8 % 2 3,2 % 2 5,0 %
Retail 11 5,0 % 4 6,5 % 0 0,0 %
Construction 9 4,1 % 1 1,6 % 1 2,5 %
Consumer goods 8 3,7 % 2 3,2 % 1 2,5 %
Healthcare 7 3,2 % 3 4,8 % 0 0,0 %
Chemicals 7 3,2 % 2 3,2 % 2 5,0 %
Personal services 7 3,2 % 2 3,2 % 2 5,0 %
Electronic equipment 6 2,7 % 1 1,6 % 0 0,0 %
Food products 5 2,3 % 3 4,8 % 3 7,5 %
Real estate 5 2,3 % 2 3,2 % 2 5,0 %
Business supplies 5 2,3 % 2 3,2 % 1 2,5 %
Steel works 5 2,3 % 1 1,6 % 1 2,5 %
Electrical equipment 4 1,8 % 2 3,2 % 1 2,5 %
Pharmaceutical products 3 1,4 % 1 1,6 % 1 2,5 %
Textiles 3 1,4 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
Printing and publishing 3 1,4 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
Communication 2 0,9 % 2 3,2 % 1 2,5 %
Apparel 2 0,9 % 2 3,2 % 2 5,0 %
Recreation 2 0,9 % 1 1,6 % 0 0,0 %
Fabricated products 2 0,9 % 1 1,6 % 1 2,5 %
Others 17 7,8 % 0 0,0 % 0 0,0 %
Total 219 100,0 % 62 100,0 % 40 100,0 %
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The representativeness off the final sample is put in to test also in Table 2, where is shown 
the outcomes and holding period’s duration of the buyout companies. By outcome it is meant 
the possible route of exit or on the contrary the lack of exit. The outcomes of the buyouts are 
hand-collected mainly from the websites’ of the private equity companies. Then, the duration 
is calculated from the time between the sample buyout and the outcome. Again, the final 
sample is compared to the initial sample to ensure the representativeness off the final sample. 
As a result of the comparison, the outcomes are quite similar between the final sample and 
initial sample. The durations are quite alike between the final sample of secondary buyouts 
and the initial sample of secondary buyouts. The sample statistics in Table 1 and Table 2 
shows that the final sample resembles the whole buyout market in Finland. 
 
Table 2. Deal outcomes and duration. Panel A presents the outcomes of the sample of buyouts and the 
comparison of the outcomes of the whole sample and final sample of secondary buyouts. Panel B shows the 
same with the duration of the investment. Duration expressed in moths. 
 
 
Table 3 shows more detail information about the target companies in final sample of buyouts. 
Notable is, that secondary buyout target companies are significantly large measured by total 
assets, fixed assets sales. Also, targets of secondary buyouts create more operating cash flows 
when measured by EBITDA year prior the buyout. On the contrary, targets of first-time 
buyouts are slightly more profitable. 
 
Outcome Secondary buyouts First-time buyouts
All Final sample All
Panel A: Deal outcomes
IPO 3 5 % 3 8 % 3 2 %
Sold to strategic buyer 11 18 % 7 18 % 30 19 %
Secondary buyout 7 11 % 5 13 % 26 17 %
Sold to management 1 2 % 1 3 % 14 9 %
Bancruptcy 1 2 % 1 3 % 7 4 %
No exit 39 63 % 23 58 % 77 49 %
Total 62 100 % 40 100 % 157 100 %
Panel B: Duration
IPO 89 89 46
Sold to strategic buyer 54 80 67
Secondary buyout 38 40 48,5
Sold to management 58 58 68,5
Bancruptcy 40 40 72,5
No exit - - -
Total 53 66 56
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Table 3. Sample summary statistics. Table presents the observations, mean, median and standard deviation of 
the characteristics of the target companies year prior the buyout. Column Diff (1-2) shows the comparison 
between the secondary and first-time buyout. To test whether the medians are significantly different, 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are performed. *, **, and *** signify the statistical significance at the 10 %, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Other data used in this thesis is gathered from several sources. The industry IPO volume used 
in liquidity-based market timing hypothesis is from Nasdaq OMX Nordic’s (2016) website, 
and the high yield debt issuance used in liquidity-based market timing hypothesis and on the 
pricing examination is from S&P Capital IQ database. Accounting information of the private 
companies used in industry-adjustments are from the same databases as the accounting 
information of the buyout target companies’, from Orbis, Kauppalehti Tietopalvelu and 
Suomen Asiakastieto. 
 
In the final phase of this thesis the pricing of secondary buyouts is tested. The deal 
information of non-buyout deals used in the secondary buyout pricing examination is also 
from Mergermarket. In all of the deals the deal value is not announced. Those deals are then 
dropped from the sample. Out of 140 buyouts with target company’s consolidated financial 
statement there were 51 announced deal value. After dropping the target companies with 
negative earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations (EBITDA) the final 
sample of buyout with announced deal value is 47. 16 of them are secondary buyouts and 31 
first-time buyouts.    
 
 
 
 
All Secondary buyout (1) First-time buyouts Diff (1-2)
N Mean Median Std Dev. N Mean Median N Mean Median
Size
Total assets 140 66,96 14,68 160,43 40 138,45 44,38 100 38,40 11,13 33,25***
Fixed assets 140 37,46 4,28 99,11 40 84,63 19,26 100 18,60 2,96 16,30***
Sales 140 84,09 25,80 180,28 40 159,82 56,19 100 53,80 17,09 39,10***
Profits and profitability
EBITDA 140 9,93 3,19 20,63 40 18,86 8,97 100 6,36 2,22 6,75***
EBITDA/sales 140 -0,01 0,12 1,24 40 0,14 0,12 100 -0,06 0,12 0,00
EBITDA/fixed assets 140 3,01 0,57 14,75 40 0,73 0,34 100 3,92 0,72 -0,38***
ROA 140 0,06 0,07 0,33 40 0,06 0,04 100 0,06 0,09 -0,06***
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4.2. Methodology 
 
In empirical analysis this thesis consider the three possible motives for secondary buyouts. 
These three motives are efficiency gains, liquidity-based market timing and collusion. The 
methodology of the empirical analysis follows the Wang (2012) study about secondary 
buyouts in UK, more precisely the target companies from UK. 
 
4.2.1. Analysis of the efficiency gains motive 
 
To test the efficiency gains the changes in target companies’ operating performance is 
examined year-by-year within five-year event window [-2, +3]. These five years includes the 
two years prior the buyout and three years after the buyout. The event window is chosen to 
be long enough to discover the possible trends in changes of operating performance, on the 
other hand not too long to avoid the possible noise. As Wang (2012) mention, this simple 
year-by-year study is appropriate for detailed examination of operational changes in buyouts, 
when Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is excessively sensitive to the large end points. 
 
If the driver of the secondary buyouts is the efficiency gains, there should be found 
improvements in the target companies’ operating performance after the buyout. To 
investigate the possible improvements the percentage changes in target companies’ size, 
operating cash flow, and profitability. Only the median percentage changes in these operating 
performance indicators is used, mean percentage changes would overemphasize the possible 
very large or small changes because of the sample size. Industry-adjusted medians is also 
computed to control the industry-wide effect. The industry division is made according the 
Fama-French 48 industry. In addition, small and large companies are compared with each 
other to see if the economies of scale has an impact on operational performance.  
 
The proxies used for size is sales and fixed assets. Following Wang (2012), total assets could 
be noisy proxy for size, because of possible write-ups of assets from mergers and 
acquisitions. The proxy used for operating cash flow is earnings before interests, taxes 
depreciations and amortization (EBITDA). Profitability is investigated through several key 
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ratios. These ratios are EBITDA/fixed assets, EBITDA/sales, earnings/sales, and return on 
assets (ROA).  All of these proxies are calculated as a raw median percentage changes and 
industry-adjusted median percentage changes. The industry-adjusted percentage changes are 
calculated by subtracting from the target companies’ raw value the median value of particular 
proxy of a sample (5) of private companies in the same industry from Finland for a given 
fiscal year. 
 
There might be a problem about the industry-adjusted medians per se, thus the capital 
structure and debt loads are quite different between target companies and private companies. 
Because of that, the changes in secondary buyouts target companies’ operating performance 
is compared to first-time buyouts target companies operating performance. Also, because 
some of the secondary or first-time buyout target companies are the only representative in 
their industry, the comparison is made by dropping those single individuals from the 
comparison. 
 
4.2.2. Analysis of the liquidity-based market timing 
 
The liquidity-based market timing as a motive for secondary buyouts is examined by 
analyzing how probable is the exit through the secondary buyout. This analysis is made by 
comparing the probability to the exits through IPO or selling to a strategic buyer, and taken 
the market conditions and seller’s liquidity into account. Altogether 72 exits were identified 
from our sample of buyouts with consolidated financial statements. 
 
Following  Wang (2012) the regression model used in this thesis is the probit model. In probit 
model regression the dependent variable is either one zero. The probit model is a Binary 
Dependent Variable Model, in which the outcome of event whose probability is examined 
equals one and all the other possible outcomes equals zero. Therefore, in our examination the 
secondary buyouts equal one and the first-time buyouts equals zero. 
 
The main explanatory variables are Industry IPO volume which is the logarithm of the 
industry IPO volume in Finland in exit year, and High-yield market size which is the 
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logarithm of the high-yield bond issuance in Europe in the year of exit. The Industry IPO 
volume is a proxy for equity market condition and the High-yield market size is a proxy for 
debt market condition. Based on the liquidity-based market timing theory the equity market 
condition should be negatively associated with the exit through secondary buyout. On the 
contrary, debt market should be positively associated with probability of exiting through 
secondary buyout. In addition, the control variables is added on regression to control firm 
characteristics. These variables are fixed assets three years after the buyout, EBITDA growth 
measured in the third year after the buyout, and average sales growth for all the companies 
in the same industry based on Fama-French 48 industry. Also, year dummy is added in 
regression, and variables are clustered by year. 
 
In addition, another probit regression is run. In this another regression is added one main 
explanatory variable, Log (holding period). This variable is a logarithm of the holding period 
of the target company in months before the exit. The holding period is a proxy for the liquidity 
demand. Liquidity demand should be negatively associated with probability of exiting 
through secondary buyout. Other variables remain in the latter regression. 
 
As Wang (2012) mention, there is obvious problem in the analysis; the exit route can only 
be identified if the exit has occurred. Thus, there is a potential sample selection problem in 
the analysis. This is corrected by following the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model. 
At first stage the whole sample of buyouts is regressed with probit model to predict the 
companies which are more probable to exit. In this regression the explanatory variables are 
Seller reputation which is based on the PEI 300 listing (Private Equity International 2016) 
of the largest private equity companies,  Log (assets) before buyout which is the total assets 
of the target company one year prior the buyout, and Pre-buyout EBITDA/sales  which is the 
target company’s profitability ratio one year before buyout. These are all proxies for the 
significance of the buyout economically. (Wang 2012) In the second stage of Heckman two-
stage selection model the inverse Mill’s ratio, which is the result from the first stage, is 
included in the probit model analysis of the sample of identified exits. From this regression 
the ρ-value is critical. It is the correlation between the error term for the selection and the 
treatment equation (first-stage of the Heckman model). If this ρ-value is not significantly 
different from zero and the results do not change meaningfully, the selection problem does 
not exist.  
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4.2.3. Analysis of the collusion 
 
The analysis of third and final motive for secondary buyout is the examination of the possible 
trade patterns between private equity companies. As the collusion motive states, private 
equity companies are helping each other to exit. If that is the case, there should be some kind 
of trade pattern between the most active operators in private equity sector. 
 
To find out these possible trade patterns, the secondary buyouts’ sellers and buyers are put 
in to the cross-participation matrix. The cross-participation matrix should show the clear 
trade patterns. By trade pattern is meant the two-way deals between the private equity 
companies. Two-way deals is a pattern where two private equity companies have been both 
on sell-side and buy-side with each other. The collusion motive states that if the private equity 
company helps another private equity company to exit their bad asset, mutually the other will 
do the same eventually. 
 
Following Wang (2012), if the two-way deals are found, the significance of the amount of 
two-way deals is then tested. The cross-participation matrix is compared to the bootstrapped 
sample of 100.000 cross-participation matrices based on the actual number of deals. The 
rationale behind the test is to examine if the random pattern based on bootstrapping is similar 
to the real-life patterns. 
 
4.2.4. Pricing of secondary buyouts 
 
As Wang (2012) stated, the three possible motives for secondary buyouts have implications 
on the pricing of secondary buyouts. Therefore, it is rationale to study how the secondary 
buyouts are priced. This study is made by using the first-time buyout pricing as an assessment 
for secondary buyouts.  
 
Following Wang (2012) the first step is to define the measures to evaluate the pricing of 
buyouts. The first measure is Log EV which is the logarithm of the enterprise value. The 
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enterprise value is calculated by subtracting from deal value the assumed liabilities of the 
target company year prior the buyout and total debt excluding the cash year prior the buyout. 
The second measure is EV Multiple, which reflects the target company’s fundamentals. EV 
Multiple is calculated as follows 
 
(1)            EV Multiple = [Enterprise value / sales * Enterprise value / EBITDA] / 2 
 
where the Enterprise value is the earlier defined enterprise value calculated from deal value, 
and sales  and EBITDA are from the target company’s financial statement year prior the 
buyout. As Wang (2012) states, both Enterprise value / sales and Enterprise value / EBITDA 
are both very noisy measures, and therefore as fundamental measure is used the average of 
them. Using these measures the pricing of secondary buyouts can be evaluated assessed by 
first-time buyout. 
 
To dig deeper the how secondary buyouts are priced, the previous measures is combined in 
comparable industry transaction method. In comparable industry transaction method for 
every target company in the sample are gathered portfolio of non-buyout mergers and 
acquisitions target companies from the same industry. In this part of the thesis the Fama-
French 10 industry classification is used because not all of the private companies had but two 
digit SIC code. Also, the non-buyouts is gathered so that the transactions have occurred in 
three-year window preceding the buyout.  From these portfolio companies the previously 
mentioned measures Log EV and EV Multiple are calculated and subtracted them from the 
buyout companies’ measures. The percentage change of the Log EV and EV Multiple is now 
the new Log EV and EV Multiple to be used in regression. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) 
investigate the valuation methods and find the comparable industry transaction method more 
accurate than other comparable methods or “traditional” Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. 
 
To investigate how secondary buyouts are priced the regression is run where the dependent 
variables are the new Log EV in first regression and the new EV Multiple in second 
regression. Independent variables are Secondary, Log (Assets), PE Reputation, High-yield 
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market size and Secondary * High yield market size. Secondary is an indicator variable which 
equals zero if the buyout is first-time buyout and one if the buyout is secondary. It is the main 
explanatory variable which tells if secondary buyouts are associated with higher prices. The 
other independent variables in turn are assumed to be the drivers of that higher price.  
 
Shortly, Log (Assets) is a logarithm of the total assets in year prior the buyout.  PE Reputation 
is another indicator variable which equals one if the acquirer is on the PEI 300 list (Private 
Equity International 2016), ergo is one of the 300 largest private equity company. Otherwise 
it equals zero. High-yield market size is the high-yield market issuance in Europe in the 
buyout year. Secondary * High-yield market size is an interaction term of the previous 
variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The results of the empirical research are presented in the following subchapters. First three 
subchapters consider the potential motives for secondary buyouts, and the lastly the fourth 
subchapter consider the pricing of secondary buyouts. 
 
5.1. Efficiency gains motive 
 
Efficiency gains theory suggest that secondary buyouts are driven by the enhancements of 
operating performance likewise the buyouts in the first place. The efficiency gain hypothesis 
is tested with year-by-year examination within five-year event window. At the first stage the 
targets of secondary buyouts alone are under examination. Also, the comparison between 
small and large targets of secondary buyouts are tested. Later, the secondary buyouts and 
first-time buyouts are compared. In all of these phases the percentage median changes of 
operating performance are also adjusted by industry. 
 
Table 4 shows the results from first two stages. Panel A illustrates the development in 
operating performance of the target companies. As a result, companies tend to increase their 
sales and operating cash flow prior the buyout. The percentage median growth of EBITDA 
year prior buyout is 38, 3 % and the sales 14, 5 %. What is interesting, that the growth has 
become in detriment of profitability.  
 
The development after the buyout shows that the size of the companies grows significantly. 
The fixed assets grow at the rate 294,3 %, 274,2 %, and 248,1 % at one, two, and three year 
after the buyout, respectively. In the same time lapse the sales growth is 19,2 %, 27,6 %, and 
41,0 %. The operating cash flow proxy EBITDA instead do not show any significant 
development. Therefore, the profitability of companies goes downward. 
 
The enormous negative percentage median changes in profitability can be explain with as 
enormous growth in size. Therefore the results are inconsistent with the prior literature who 
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Table 4. The effect of secondary buyouts on the target firms' operating performance. Panel A illustrates the raw 
and industry-adjusted median percentage changes in operating performance from year i to j. Panel B shows the 
percentage change for small and large target companies. Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests are 
performed to test if the percentage changes are significantly different from zero. *, **, and  *** signify statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: All secondary -buyouts targets
N=40
-2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3
A. Size measures
Fixed assets
Median change -3,9 % *** 294,3 % *** 274,2 % * 248,1 % *
Industry adjusted -27,9 % ** 105,8 % *** 125,8 % *** 84,8 % ***
Sales
Median change 14,5 % *** 19,2 % *** 27,6 % *** 41,0 % ***
Industry adjusted 19,2 % *** 12,1 % *** 18,2 % *** 10,5 % ***
B.1 Operating cash-flow
EBITDA
Median change 38,3 % *** 1,3 % ** -8,1 % ** -1,6 % *
Industry adjusted 15,4 % *** 1,9 % * -38,0 % * -35,0 % *
EBITDA/sales
Median change 16,4 % *** -21,2 % *** -23,9 % *** -35,0 % ***
Industry adjusted 27,4 % * -19,8 % *** -46,7 % *** -37,4 % ***
EBITDA/Fixed assets
Median change 30,3 % *** -65,7 % ** -78,3 % ** -69,9 % ***
Industry adjusted 8,6 % -49,2 % * -54,5 % *** -55,4 % ***
B.2 Profitability ratios
Earnings/sales
Median change -25,5 % ** -199,8 % *** -217,0 % *** -182,1 % **
Industry adjusted -55,9 % ** -251,0 % *** -277,3 % *** -186,4 % **
ROA
Median change -8,8 % ** -153,9 % *** -158,9 % *** -149,0 % ***
Industry adjusted -20,3 % ** -202,2 % *** -234,7 % *** -207,0 % ***
shows that buyouts have positive impact on company’s efficiency. In addition the industry-
adjusted key figures shows even worse trend.  
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Panel B: Large vs. small firms
Small (20) from year i to year j Large (20) from year i to year j
-1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3
A. Size measures
Fixed assets At year -1 4,3 At year -1 90,8
Median change * 448,3 % *** 465,6 % *** 443,8 % *** 72,8 % *** 66,0 % *** 86,7 % ***
Industry adjusted *** 229,2 % *** 347,7 % *** 386,5 % *** 38,1 % * 30,1 % 22,4 %
Sales At year -1 33,5 At year -1 167,0
Median change *** 32,1 % *** 48,7 % *** 62,9 % ** 14,4 % ** 17,7 % *** 16,4 % **
Industry adjusted *** 37,3 % *** 55,2 % *** 41,2 % ** 3,4 % 0,0 % 0,0 %
B.1 Operating cash-flow
EBITDA At year -1 3,7 At year -1 21,9
Median change 8,3 % -36,1 % ** 7,7 % -2,3 % -2,0 % -8,2 %
Industry adjusted ** 33,8 % * 59,5 % ** 35,0 % * -14,4 % -16,4 % -13,3 %
EBITDA/sales At year -1 0,11 At year -1 0,12
Median change -19,0 % -40,2 % * -35,1 % * -22,5 % -15,3 % -30,2 %
Industry adjusted ** -102,1 % ** -115,0 % ** -107,1 % ** ***-96,5 % *** -93,4 % *** -98,7 % ***
EBITDA/Fixed assetsAt year -1 0,57 At year -1 0,21
Median change *** -76,7 % *** -83,9 % *** -77,9 % *** -53,2 % ** -36,4 % -53,7 % *
Industry adjusted *** -136,5 % *** -152,0 % *** -157,3 % *** **-151,8 % *** -148,8 % *** -149,5 % **
B.2 Profitability ratios
Earnings/sales At year -1 0,03 At year -1 0,02
Median change -199,9 % *** -271,6 % ** -182,1 % ** -197,0 % ** -202,8 % ** -106,2 % *
Industry adjusted -222,0 % *** -316,1 % ** -244,8 % *** *-249,3 % *** -228,6 % *** -80,2 %
ROA At year -1 0,06 At year -1 0,03
Median change -140,5 % *** -187,4 % *** -168,0 % *** -148,0 % ** -141,8 % ** -103,5 % *
Industry adjusted -204,1 % *** -313,0 % *** -251,8 % *** **-187,0 % ** -175,1 % ** -145,2 % **
Panel B shows the results of the same examination when companies are divided into small 
and large. Small companies tend to grow significantly faster than large companies. However, 
both large and small companies seem to have equally negative development of profitability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the third and final phase of testing the efficiency gains motive. 
The percentage differences between secondary buyouts and first-time buyouts is calculated 
subtracting the first-time buyout medians from secondary buyout median. Therefore the 
positive number means that the change has been stronger among the targets of secondary 
buyouts. Notable is, that after secondary buyout the size change measured by fixed assets are 
considerably higher. Also industry-adjusted percentage changes in sales are significantly 
higher after secondary buyouts. 
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Table 5. Differences in operating performance changes between secondary and first-time buyouts.  Table 
illustrates the differences in median changes in operating performance for secondary and first-time buyouts. 
Secondary vs first-time same industry means that only industries with both SBO and FTBO occur. Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test is performed for the median difference between secondary and first-time buyouts. *, **, and 
***signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Secondary vs. first-time Secondary vs. first-time
 from year i to year j same industry from year i to j
-1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3 -1 to +1 -1 to +2 -1 to +3
A. Size measures
Fixed assets
Median change 109,7 % *** 64,3 % *** 35,5 % ** 111,9 % *** 60,1 % *** 17,8 %
Industry adjusted change 38,8 % 63,0 % ** 44,0 % ** 86,0 % *** 94,0 % *** 66,9 % **
Sales
Median change -2,4 % * -2,8 % * 7,1 % -4,7 % 0,6 % 7,8 %
Industry adjusted change 23,8 % * 6,4 % 20,8 % * 39,1 % ** 22,4 % * 39,03 % **
B.1 Operating cash-flow
EBITDA
Median change -0,8 % ** 0,7 % -18,5 % ** 2,1 % 1,7 % -13,9 %
Industry adjusted change -2,8 % * 4,3 % -21,7 % ** 4,5 % *** 3,5 % *** -25,5 % ***
EBITDA/sales
Median change 4,0 % -6,1 % -11,2 % 1,5 % -5,6 % -11,7 %
Industry adjusted change 3,6 % 1,1 % -7,6 % 4,1 % * -8,6 % -16,4 %
EBITDA/Fixed assets
Median change -5,8 % 1,3 % -14,4 % -6,9 % 1,3 % -14,6 %
Industry adjusted change 4,5 % *** 5,1 % *** -8,2 % *** 4,7 % *** 6,4 % *** -8,4 % ***
B.2 Profitability ratios
Earnings/sales
Median change 104,2 % *** 120,3 % *** 65,9 % *** 101,7 % *** 120,2 % *** 73,9 % ***
Industry adjusted change 115,8 % *** 148,4 % *** 35,6 % *** 111,1 % *** 148,4 % *** 69,6 % ***
ROAMedian change 55,7 % *** 63,5 % *** 35,6 % *** 54,9 % *** 62,9 % *** 40,3 % *
Industry adjusted change 76,3 % *** 105,1 % *** 62,0 % *** 68,8 % *** 105,1 % *** 78,5 % ***
Number of secondary buyout targets 40 36
Number of first-time buyout targets 157 75
The same trend is with operating cash flows measured by EBITDA. The percentage industry-
adjusted median changes of EBITDA is remarkably high in years one and three after the 
secondary buyout in comparison to first-time buyouts. 
 
The profitability ratios from the Table 5 shows that the trend is clear when compared the 
secondary buyouts and first-time buyouts. 
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Although the EBITDA grows stronger after secondary buyouts, the target companies cannot 
produce enough earnings to cover the expenses of the growth in size.  
 
In the light of the previous results, the findings are inconsistent with the previous literature 
considering the operating performance enhancement after buyouts. The operating 
performance do not seem to develop in a positive way. Actually, the efficiency crashes after 
the buyout. That suggests that the large debt load and the expenses of it are eating the profit. 
The comparison between the first-time buyouts and secondary buyouts shows that the 
development of the operating performance after secondary buyout is mixed. The operating 
cash flows tends to develop more positive way after secondary buyouts, but still the 
efficiency develops the reverse way. Shortly, from this sample the efficiency gains do not 
seem to be the motive for secondary buyout. 
 
5.2. Liquidity-based market timing motive 
 
In examination of liquidity-based market timing the probit model is used to discover the 
probability of companies exiting through secondary buyouts. The other possible exit routes 
in this examination are IPO and sales to a strategic buyer. Explanatory variables in the 
analysis are the market conditions and the demand of seller’s liquidity. 
 
Results in Table 6 show that the equity market condition is negatively associated with the 
exit through secondary buyouts. That says that when equity markets are hot, companies prefer 
the exit through the IPO or strategic buyer. Without controlling the debt conditions, the 
increase of IPO volume by one unit lowers the probability to exit through secondary buyouts 
almost five per cent. Also, debt market condition shows the reverse results when the equity 
market condition is not controlled, as expected. 
 
When both equity market condition and debt market condition are added in regression, the 
results are statistically more significant. One unit increase of IPO volume decrease the 
probability to exit through secondary buyout 12,6 %. On the contrary, one per cent increase 
in high-yield debt issuance grows the probability to exit through secondary buyouts 155%.  
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Table 6 also shows the results from Heckman selection model. The ρ-value of Heckman 
selection model stays close to zero, and the results does not change meaningfully. Thus, the 
sample selection problem seem to non-exists.  
 
The effect of holding period on firms’ exit decision is also investigated. Table 7 shows the 
result of the probit model. Findings are that duration seems to impact the probability of 
exiting through secondary buyout when controlling the market condition and firm 
characteristics also. However, the result is not statistically significant. Thus, the seller’s 
demand of liquidity’s impact on exit choice is not verified.  
 
Again, Table 6 shows the results of Heckman selection model. There do not seem to be a 
sample selection problem, ρ-value is close to zero and the results do not change meaningfully. 
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The evidence of liquidity-based market timing as a motive for secondary buyout shows 
support the theories and previous studies, that exit choice has strong relationship with equity 
market condition and debt market condition. However, the evidence of the exit choice 
because of the liquidity demand is yet not verified.  
 
 
 
 
 
Probit Heckman selection
(1) (2) (3) (Exiting) (Secondary exit)
Industry IPO volume -0,047* -0,126** -0,052
(0,0736) (0,0423) (0,5412)
High yield market size 1,17** 1,553** 0,973
(0,0447) (0,0153) (0,0133)
Log(assets) after buyout 0,937*** 0,969554*** 0,969*** 0,209
(0,0014) (0,0010) (0,0010) (0,1611)
EBITDA growth -0,014 -0,001 0,084
(0,9638) (0,9043) (0,9965) (0,3969)
Industry sales growth -0,003** -0,002** -0,003* -0,003*
(0,0249) (0,0273) (0,0169) (0,0662)
Seller reputation 0,526**
(0,0312)
Log(assets) before buyout 0,538**
(0,046)
Pre-buyout EBITDA/sales 0,746
(0,7324)
ρ 0,052*
(0,0721)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster by industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 72 72 140
McFadden R-squared 0,276338 0,274955
Table 6. The effect of market conditions on firms' exit choices. Table shows the results from probit regression model of 
company’s exit choices. Also, it illustrates Heckman’s selection model. All regressions include year dummies. Standard 
errrors clustered by industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Probit Heckman selection
(1) (Exiting) (Secondary exit)
Log (holding period) 1,0578 0,587
(0,0484) (0,6479)
Industry IPO volume -0,1485 -0,1227
(0,3760) (0,4423)
High yield market size 2,2327 1,3419**
(0,3120) (0,0262)
Log (assets) after buyout 0,9909*** 0,9721***
(0,0001) (0,0017)
EBITDA growth -0,0072 -0,004
(0,9536) (0,9710)
Industry sales growth -0,0028 -0,0030*
(0,2041) (0,01816)
Seller reputation 0,2709*
(0,0584)
Log (assets) before buyout 0,6301**
(0,0149)
Pre-buyout EBITDA/sales 0,3889
(0,8533)
ρ 0,007611
Year dummies Yes Yes
Cluster by industry Yes Yes
Number of observations 140
Pseudo R2 0,249857
Table 7. The effect of holding period on firms' exit decision. Table illustrates the effect of holding period 
duration on exit through secondary buyout. Again, also Heckman selection model presented. All 
regressions include year dummies. Standard errors clustered by industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Capman Industri Midinvest AAC Profita EQT MB Vaaka Sponsor Helmet Primaca 3i
Kapital Capital Funds Capital
Capman 2 - - - - - - 0 - 2 1
Industri Kapital 0 - - - - - - - - - -
Midinvest - - - - - - 1 1 - - -
AAC Capital - - - 0 - - - 0 - - 0
Profita - - - 2 1 1 - - - - -
EQT - - - - 0 - 0 0 - - -
MB Funds - - - - 0 - 0 - - - -
Vaaka - - 0 - - 1 1 - - - -
Sponsor Capital 1 - 0 1 - 1 - - - - -
Helmet - - - - - - - - - 2 -
Primaca 0 - - - - - - - - 0 1
3i ´0 - - 1 - - - - - - 0
Table 8. Transactions by the 12 most active buyers and sellers. Buyers is shown in x-axis and sellers in y-
axis. A dash “ – “ means no transaction between the two private equity company, zero means only one-way 
deals between the two company. 
5.3. Collusion motive 
 
The third and final potential motive for secondary buyout is the collusion motive. That 
suggests that private equity companies help each other to exit their bad assets. The 
methodology of examine the collusion motive requires to identify the two-way deals between 
private equity companies. For this identification the cross-participation matrix is constructed 
to find possible trade patterns. 
 
The evidence from Finnish secondary buyout markets are quite unambiguous. There were 62 
secondary buyouts in 2002-2014, and zero two-way deals. By two-way deal is meant the 
trade pattern where two private equity companies both acquire and sell the target with each 
other. Table 8 illustrates the part of cross-participation matrix where is shown the transactions 
between the 12 most active buyers and sellers. 
 
Because of the lack of two-way deals, the bootstrapped sample of trade patterns is left 
undone. The collusion motive do not seem to get evidence at least not among the transactions 
of Finnish target companies. Thus, the result is significant only concerning the trading in 
Finland. 
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5.4. Determinants of the pricing of secondary buyouts 
 
The potential motives for secondary buyouts should effect also in the pricing of secondary 
buyouts. From the three possible motives for secondary buyouts the liquidity-based market 
timing get support. Therefore, to test the pricing of secondary buyouts against first-time 
buyouts, the comparable industry transaction method is used.  
 
Table 9 shows the results of the examination of how the secondary buyouts are priced. Panel 
A shows the differences in measures of deal pricing between first-time buyouts and 
secondary buyouts. These measures are logarithm of enterprise value and EV multiple. 
Finding is that as expected, the secondary buyouts are priced with higher value. The 
differences are significant. 
 
Panel B shows the OLS regression of the deal pricing. Comparable industry transaction 
method is used to construct the new dependent variables, which represents the discount or 
premium of the value of secondary buyout deal.  Result of the regression shows that the 
enterprise value is 14,6 % higher in secondary buyouts. Also, the EV Multiple is remarkably 
higher in secondary buyouts. However, the result in EV Multiple is significant only at the 10 
% level. 
 
The other drivers affecting on the pricing of secondary buyouts the debt market condition 
show some significant results. The increase of one per cent in high-yield debt issuance 
increases the enterprise value 10,8 %. That finding is consistent with the liquidity-based 
market timing theory, and previous study of Axelson et al. (2013) and Wang (2012). They 
find that hot debt market can lead to higher deal pricing. 
 
The results of other drivers affecting on the deal pricing leave insignificant. The reputation 
of the buyer is negatively associated with deal pricing, which is inconsistent with the studies 
of Wang (2012) and Demiroglu and James (2010). According to them, the better reputation 
means better channels of financing and therefore higher deal prices. 
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Table 9. Determinants of deal pricing. The table shows how secondary buyouts are priced against to first-time 
buyouts. Panel A shows the comparison between secondary and first-time buyout. Panel B shows the results 
from regression adjusted with comparable industry transaction method. Comparable acquisitions within three-
year window preceding the buyout. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** signify statistical 
significance at the 10 %, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics
All Secondary buyouts (1) First-time buyouts (2) Diff. (1-2)
N Mean Median Std dev N Mean Median N Mean Median
Log EV 47 4,72 4,78 0,69 16 5,12 5,28 31 4,51 4,30 0,98
EV Multiple 47 14,4 10,09 15,23 16 15,13 10,24 31 14,02 9,58 0,66
EV Difference EV Multiple difference
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel B: Three-year window preceding
deal announcement 
Secondary 0,1456*** 0,301* 1,2977* 0,292
(0,0045) (0,0504) (0,0501) (0,9586)
Log (assets) 0,143*** 0,191*
(0,0006) (0,0896)
PE Buyer reputation -0,042 -0,678
(0,5518) (0,384)
High-yield market size 0,1087** 0,421*
(0,01469) (0,0867)
Secondary * high-yield market size -0,186* -0,309
(0,0841) (0,9622)
Intescept -1,167 -0,9928 -1,357 -1,284
Cluster by year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 47 47 47 47
Adjusted R2 0,11 0,6542 0,0109 0,2788
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In 21st century, the secondary buyouts have grown a stable and economically significant field 
of private equity industry. At the same time the questions have aroused. To whom are these 
secondary buyouts beneficial?  
 
This thesis investigates the logic behind the secondary buyouts. Because the value creation 
potential is uncertain because of the earlier buyout, the other possible explanations of the 
growing field of private equity industry is examined. The thesis focuses on secondary 
buyouts of Finnish target companied between 2002 and 2014. With a unique hand-collected 
sample of 40 secondary buyouts and 100 first-time buyouts the possible motivation for 
secondary buyouts is tested.  
 
The previous studies have shown the value creation of buyouts to effect on target companies’ 
operating performance. The improvement of operating performance can be achieved through 
increased revenues, cost reducing or efficiency. Therefore the value creation potential in 
secondary buyouts is controversial.  
 
This thesis find no evidence of the efficiency gains of secondary buyouts. As a result in year-
by-year examination, there were no significant improvements of operating cash flow. In 
addition, the profitability and therefore the efficiency has dropped significantly. The main 
reason for dropped efficiency is the enormous growth in size measured with fixed assets. 
Also sales has grown, although not as significantly. The results are consistent with the 
previous literature of Wang (2012) and Bonini (2012). 
 
 To test the market condition’s impact on probability to exit through secondary buyouts, in 
this thesis the liquidity-based market timing hypothesis is tested. Results show that the debt 
market conditions are the main driver of the probability of exit through secondary buyouts. 
When debt markets are favorable, the probability to exit through secondary buyouts grows. 
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On the contrary, the equity markets is found to have a positive relationship with the 
probability in secondary buyouts. This is consistent with the previous studies of Wang (2012) 
and Bonini (2011). In addition, the size of the target company is positively associated with 
the probability of secondary buyouts. Study finds no significant evidence on the holding 
period’s effect on the probability of exit through the secondary buyouts. 
 
The thesis also test the collusion motive for secondary buyouts. This motive suggests that the 
secondary buyouts are driven by the private equity companies which are helping each other 
to exit the bad assets. Study find no evidence of the collusion in Finland. Secondary buyouts 
of Finnish target companies between 2002 and 2014 does not exist any two-way deal. The 
lack of two-way deals means that there is not an identifiable trading patterns. Therefore the 
former investigations are rejected. The collusion motive is consistent with the previous 
studies, although the significance of the national study of collusion might be irrational in 
today’s ever globalize world.  
 
Finally, the thesis studies the pricing of the secondary buyouts. With the use of comparable 
industry transaction method the secondary buyouts pricing is investigated against first-time 
buy-outs. The thesis finds that secondary buyout deals are priced significantly higher value. 
Based on the analysis the reason behind the higher value is the size and the debt market 
conditions. Target companies in secondary buyouts are considerably larger, and therefore 
obviously more expensive. The result of debt market conditions’ impact on the pricing of the 
secondary buyout is consistent with the previous literature and with the liquidity-based 
market timing hypothesis. 
 
The logic behind the secondary buyouts is different in comparison with the first-time 
buyouts. The value creation potential which is realized in first-time buyouts and can be seen 
on the target companies’ operating performance after buyout is not the main driver of the 
secondary buyouts. The primary mover seem to be the market conditions. In Finland the debt 
market conditions are the main driver of secondary buyouts. Suggestion is that with more 
active stock market also the equity market’s impact would be more significant. The reason 
behind the deals with high price tag in secondary buyouts also is explained in the large size 
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of the targets of secondary buyouts, and the debt market condition as liquidity-base market 
timing theory suggested.  
 
To sum up, the secondary buyouts are the product of the era. There do not seem to include 
any mystique in the secondary buyouts, rather they are the inevitable private equity 
companies is needed to be done to survive. What is not solved, is the main logic of the 
secondary buyouts from the point of view of the buyer. That is left for the future research. 
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